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Abstract
This paper uses a structural model to address the question of why home-owners with large mortgage
debt work longer hours than those without such debt. We consider whether this is due to lower net wealth
or to capital market imperfections, including mortgage constraints that depend on current earnings and,
therefore, labour supply choices. We show that the need to meet current mortgage commitments can
generate the observed correlation, and this impact of current commitments arises from the institutional
borrowing constraints. We also show that labour supply as a function of household debt is highly non-
linear: those with greater debt are more likely to face binding borrowing constraints and their labour
supply is more variable.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The aim of this paper is to understand why home-owners with large mortgage debt work longer hours
than those without such debt. Interpreting this observed correlation is problematic because labour supply
and debt holdings are jointly determined, and these decisions are made in an environment with imperfect
capital markets. We use a structural model of the joint labour supply / housing choice to disentangle
three broad reasons which can explain this observed correlation: income eﬀects, capital market constraints
and unobserved heterogeneity. Further, we use our model to explore the eﬀect of changing capital market
restrictions on labour supply and debt holdings.
For many households, housing wealth comprises a large fraction of total household wealth, but it is also
often oﬀset by substantial mortgage debt. For example, in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for
2000, among the 57% of families who owned their homes, housing assets represented approximately 83%
of all non-pension assets but more than a quarter of this gross housing wealth was oﬀset by outstanding
mortgage debt.1 Among homeowners aged less than 45, housing assets represented 89% of non-pension
assets but the value of outstanding mortgage debt was equal to more than half of gross housing wealth. The
interaction between these mortgage commitments and labour supply behaviour has been studied by Fortin
(1995), Del Boca and Lusardi (2003), and Bottazzi (2007) for home-owners in Canada, Italy, and the UK
respectively. They each show that women in households with greater mortgage commitments are more likely
to participate in the labour force and/or work longer hours.
This correlation can be explained in a number of ways. Conditioning on the house price, greater mortgage
commitments suggests a lower level of wealth and this will itself lead to a wealth eﬀect of higher labour
supply. Further, mortgage repayments can be seen as committed expenditure (see Chetty and Szeidl, 2007):
i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁxed costs of buying and selling a home, households will adjust in other dimensions than
home-ownership in order to meet debt repayments. Additionally, the ability to borrow is constrained by
household income. For example, in the UK, mortgage debt is usually constrained to be less than a ﬁxed
multiple of household income, and so households may work longer hours in order to overcome this borrowing
constraint. A second borrowing constraint is the downpayment requirement on home-buyers, which may
induce households to increase labour supply and save their extra earnings to meet such a requirement. The
1BHPS numbers cited in this paragraph are the result of authors’ calculations based on data that were set up for and
m a n i p u l a t e db yB a n k s ,S m i t ha n dW a k e ﬁeld (2002).
2correlation between debt and labour supply may also be driven by unobserved heterogeneity in preferences:
some individuals may have a high (unobserved) utility from housing, and a low utility cost of work, or the
marginal disutility of work may be decreasing in home-ownership.
This brief discussion serves to highlight the complex interactions between the housing, debt and labour
supply choices. To address these, both Fortin (1995) and Bottazzi (2007) test for the endogeneity of mort-
gage payments to the labour supply decision, the latter using panel data to also control for unobserved
heterogeneity, but neither ﬁnds this endogeneity to be important. Similarly, Del Boca and Lusardi (2003)
ﬁnd only a small eﬀect of the propensity to participate in the labour market on the likelihood of having a
mortgage in a simultaneous equation model. In this paper, we adopt an alternative strategy of modelling the
joint labour supply-housing decision in a structural model to examine the nature of the interaction between
these diﬀerent decisions.
We develop a life-cycle model where households decide whether or not to buy a house, how much to
borrow or save and how much labour to supply in each period. Households make these decisions facing
uncertainty about wages and about house prices. In modeling these decisions, we pay particular attention
to the ﬁnancial instruments that households have access to. We model the details of the debt instruments
available to the households in our model after the type of instruments available in the UK in the 1990s. We
calibrate our model to match the life-cycle proﬁle of home ownership in UK data.
Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) also study a dynamic model with housing, consumption, and labour
supply. In an inﬁnite horizon framework, they show that introducing a downpayment constraint and allowing
for accelerated repayment leads to labour supply being correlated with debt. In our framework, we focus
instead on the life-cycle characteristics of home-ownership and labour supply, and we model income-related
borrowing constraints. We believe these income related constraints to be important because labour supply
choices aﬀect income and so have a direct impact on borrowing possibilities. We also explicitly introduce
house price uncertainty.
Our conclusions on the central question of why we observe the correlation between labour supply and
debt emphasise three points: ﬁrst, greater current mortgage commitments lead to greater labour supply,
even when controlling for wealth; second, the solution of our life-cycle model shows that the labour supply of
households with high debt is very sensitive to changes in the amount of debt and changes in family income,
but that this sensitivity lessens if we look at households less in debt and so is not apparent if we average across
3all households; third, tightening borrowing constraints leads to substantial eﬀects on the timing of home-
ownership over the lifetime, delaying purchases, but such tightening leads only to small eﬀects on labour
supply on average. These points suggest that for most households, wealth eﬀects and current commitments
are driving the correlation between labour supply and debt, but that for some highly indebted households,
capital constraints imply there will be a stronger correlation between debt and labour supply.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports life-cycle patterns of home ownership and
labour supply in the data. Section 3 presents the structural model, discusses the calibration strategy and
shows the calibrated solution. Section 4 addresses the question of how labour supply and home ownership
interact and the question of how changes to the capital market aﬀect home ownership and labour supply.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical background
In this section we present empirical lifecycle proﬁles of home ownership and labour supply, and of the
relationship between them, for households in the U.K. These proﬁles both put our discussion in context, and
also underlie the calibration of our model in the next section.
Home ownership Home ownership rates are relatively high in the UK, with around 4 in 5 couples aged 26
- 60 owning their home. To show how this varies over the life cycle, Figure 1 reports home-ownership rates
by age and cohort for couples. Whereas in the remainder of the paper we use panel data from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which has been available since 1991, in this section we want to display
longer time series and so draw home ownership and labour supply proﬁles from repeated cross-sections of
the Family Expenditure Survey (FES).2 To create a pseudo panel from these data, groups are deﬁned by
date-of-birth and education,3 where, as throughout this paper, education groups are deﬁned on the basis of
academic achievement of the household head, and “high education” means that the household head remained
in education beyond the compulsory period.4
2The FES is an annual cross section of around 7,000 households, who record a two-week diary of their spending and
information about recent purchases of durables and/or expensive items. The survey also provides a detailed information on
demographic factors including homeownership, education, family structure and income, and we use data for the years 1978 -
2002.
3Since the FES is a series of cross-sections rather than a true panel, we construct home-ownership rates by averaging across
individuals from a particular cohort, separately for each year of data. This generates a pseudo-panel showing how a particular
cohort behaves over time (Browning et al., 1985). Our analysis focuses on couples and so our results should be interpreted
recognising that we are conditioning on marital status which is not constant over the life-cycle.
4The age up to which schooling was compulsory was 14 until 1946, 15 until 1972, and 16 afterwards.
4Proportion owning their home 
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Figure 1: Home-Ownership over the Life-Cycle
Figure 1 shows increases in home-ownership with age (the solid lines). This increase is particularly
marked for the low educated, and each of the low education cohorts shows an increase in home ownership
during the early years of our data (the 1980s).5 This increase over time is not evident when we plot
the combined proportion of households owning or in government housing6 (the dashed lines), indicating a
transfer over time from government housing to owner occupation. In fact, in the 1980s many tenants who
rented government housing were given the opportunity to buy their homes, often at below market prices (the
so-called “right-to-buy” policy). Thus the increase in home ownership rates across the low education group
during the 1980s was largely a time rather than an age eﬀect. For this reason, we calibrate our model to
data on home ownership at diﬀerent ages during the 1990s, which we take to be representative of life cycle
proﬁles. As reported in the calibration section 3.2, these data show home ownership increasing during early
working age to a peak, during middle-age, of around 75% and 90%, respectively for the low and the high
education groups.
Female labour supply Using the same pseudo-panel underlying Figure 1, Figure 2 shows how average
hours of work of women in couples vary over the life cycle, where non-participants have hours set to zero. The
ﬁgures show the well-known decline in labour supply around the age of fertility across cohorts.7 Since these
5This pattern is even clearer if we plot home ownership against year, which we omit for the sake of brevity.
6Socially assisted rental housing in the UK is provided by local authorities and by housing association. We refer to them
jointly as “government housing.”
































































































High Education Low Education
Figure 2: Female Hours of Work Over the Life-Cycle by Cohort
ﬁgures report hours of work averaged over all women in couples, they mask the considerable heterogeneity
in labour supply among women of the same age that is related not only to family circumstances but also to
housing decisions and mortgage commitments.
Labour supply and home ownership Evidence of how this heterogeneity in female labour supply in
the UK is explained by mortgage commitments comes from Bottazzi (2007), and is summarised by Figure
3. The picture is based on BHPS data8 and shows that women in households that own their homes, and
particularly those with greater mortgage commitments, supply more labour.9 However, as discussed in the
introduction, we cannot treat the extent of debt or home-ownership as exogenous. Instead, we resort to
calibration of a structural model of housing and labour supply which enables us to model explicitly the
labour supply decision when households are making a decision about housing.
3 Life-Cycle Model of Housing and Labour Supply
In order to model the interaction between housing choices, mortgage debt and labour supply, we start from
a standard model of lifecycle consumption and labour supply in a stochastic dynamic environment. We add
to this model several features that capture the complexity of the consumer decision environment with regard
to housing and debt choices.
With regard to housing, we assume that households make a discrete choice to own a house or not. This
8The BHPS is currently available for 1991 — 2004 and its original (representative) sample tracks around 10,000 adults in 5,000
households. The survey collects information on a wide range of topics, including detailed questions on income, employment,
household composition, education and, importantly, housing choices.
9The picture is based on a sample of women whose partners work full time and a household is said to have a high mortgage



































































Figure 3: Female Hours of Work by Housing and Mortgage Status (BHPS)
captures the lumpiness inherent in housing market choices. In addition, we assume there are transaction
costs associated with changing housing market status.
Since our focus is particularly on mortgage debt, we assume in the model that households without
collateral cannot borrow.10 On the other hand, we model the mortgage market as accurately as we can,
particularly in relation to the constraints on borrowing which exist at the time that the mortgage is taken
out (whether this is when a house is bought or when a house is remortgaged). The explicit constraints on
mortgage borrowing we impose are a downpayment constraint, which speciﬁes that households can borrow
only a fraction of the value of the house, and an income-related constraint, such that households can borrow
only up to a multiple of household income. On the repayment side, we impose that, in order to avoid selling
or remortgaging the house, households must repay at least the interest on their mortgage debt. Given these
constraints, households remortgage for two reasons: when it is optimal for them or when they do not meet
the minimum mortgage repayment.
We believe that two features of the constraints that we impose are particularly important and, to our
knowledge, represent an advance relative to other papers in the literature. First, the income-related con-
straint is endogenous, i.e. it depends on the current choice of labour supply, rather than on an exogenous
income process (an example of this latter setup is Campbell and Hercowitz, 2004). This seems to us par-
ticularly relevant to our question since the income-related constraint can be relaxed by increasing labour
supply. Second, in line with practice in the housing market, we impose the mortgage constraints only when
10We could in principle relax this borrowing constraint, and introduce a diﬀerence between collateralised and non-collateralised
debt through interest rate diﬀerences.
7the mortgage is taken out (ie when the house is bought or remortgaged), rather than whenever the household
owns a house regardless of remortgaging. Imposing the constraint regardless of remortgaging is computa-
tionally convenient and typical in the literature (see, for example, Li and Yao, forthcoming, Ortalo-Magne
and Rady, 2006, Cocco, 2005, and Campbell and Hercowitz, 2004).These features of the model make the set
of constraints dependent on housing and on labour market behaviour. This makes the problem non-convex
and complicates the analysis considerably. We explain our solution method in the appendix.
3.1 Model speciﬁcation
We now specify the model in detail. A unitary household lives for T periods. In every period t ≤ T, the
household maximises utility by choosing consumption, ct, and housing ht ∈ {0,1}. In addition, prior to
retirement at age R<T, the household chooses female labour supply lt ∈ [0,1]. After retirement at age R,
we assume that lt =0and that income is not subject to risk.
For ease of exposition, we distinguish between beginning-of-period assets At and debt held at the end-
of-period Dt. Mortgage market constraints place restrictions on Dt. The household value function in period
t<Ris given by
Vt (At,h t−1,p t,w t,x t)= m a x
{ct,ht,lt}
{u(ct,h t,l t)+βEtVt+1 (At+1,h t,p t+1,w t+1,x t+1)}
where, in addition to the variables already deﬁned, the variables (pt,w t,x t) are the price of housing, the
female wage, and male earnings, and the values of these stochastic outcomes are realised at the beginning of
the period. u(·) is the within-period utility function, β is the discount factor and Et denotes expectations
at time t over the three stochastic outcomes. The time series evolution of the stochastic processes and the
form of the utility function are described at the end of this section.
The value function is subject to a per period budget constraint:
At+1 =( 1+rt+1)
½
At + xt + wtlt + ptht−1
−ct − ptht − Fpt |ht − ht−1|
¾
(1)
where the variable rt+1 is the interest rate on the liquid asset or on debt, which is assumed to be constant,11
and F is the transaction cost of selling or buying a house, which is a proportion of the house price. In
addition, optimisation is subject to constraints on borrowing, which can be described by considering three
separate scenarios:
11A constant interest rate implies that the current minimum mortgage repayment to avoid remortgaging is pre-determined.
81. If the household owns their house at the end of period t (ie. ht =1 )and has either bought their house
in period t or remortgaged in period t,d e b ti sc o n s t r a i n e db y
Dt ≤ min[λy (wtlt + xt),λ hptht]. (2)
2. If the household owns their house at the end of period t (ie. ht =1 )and is not remortgaging, debt is
constrained by
Dt ≤ Dt−1. (3)
3. If the household does not own their house at the end of period t, debt is constrained by
Dt ≤ 0 (4)
Finally, we impose the terminal condition AT+1 ≥ 0.
Equation (1) is the per period budget constraint: total resources equal beginning-of-period assets At plus
male and female earnings, xt and wtlt, plus housing wealth ptht−1. Total expenditure equals consumption ct,
plus the resources allocated to home ownership, ptht, plus transaction costs Fpt whenever home ownership
status changes. If ht−1 = ht =1 , all the terms in the budget constraint that involve housing cancel out.
The second set of constraints (equations 2, 3 and 4) are the liquidity constraints. If ht =1 , then if the
consumer wants to borrow more than the previous period (either because they are taking out a new mortgage
or because they have an existing mortgage but want to re-mortgage and borrow more), then constraint (2)
imposes that the amount they can borrow is limited to (the smaller of) λh times the value of the house
and λy times current income. The value (1 − λh) can be thought of as a downpayment requirement. If the
household wishes to continue owning and does not repay at least the interest on their outstanding debt, as
required by constraint (3), they have to remortgage and satisfy the two constraints in equation (2).
The speciﬁcation of marginal utility becoming inﬁnite at zero consumption means that the terminal
condition prevents households borrowing more than they can repay with certainty. The terminal condition
therefore translates into an implicit additional borrowing constraint.
The within period utility is speciﬁed as
u(c,h,l)=eθht
h







9This speciﬁcation contains a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function between consumption and
leisure embedded in a Constant Relative Risk Aversion function. This is supplemented by multiplicative and
additive terms that capture the value of home ownership. As we discuss in Section 3.2.2, having these two
terms allows us to consider housing as a luxury or a necessity and to allow consumption to be a complement
or substitute for consumption and leisure, depending on the outcome of the calibration. If there were
no additive term (ie if µ =0 ), then ∂u
∂h > 0 would require θ<0 when γ>1 and this would restrict
consumption and housing to be substitutes ( ∂2u
∂c∂h < 0). We use the more general speciﬁcation to avoid this
apriori restriction.
We assume that the house price is an AR(1) process, with aggregate shocks. That is










where dt is the deterministic trend, assumed to be linear.
We assume that the female wage process is a random walk12 with idiosyncratic shocks:










where at is the deterministic growth in wages, assumed to be quadratic: at = a1t + a2t2. Similarly, the

















t is the deterministic growth in wages, assumed to be quadratic: at = a1t + a2t2. xt is deﬁned as
exp(wh
t ) times normal (full-time) hours.13.
3.2 Parameter Selection
We use our model to calibrate the parameters governing the preference for home ownership and the trans-
action cost. The remaining parameters of our model are external: estimated outside the model either by us
or in the existing literature, or chosen to match institutional features. External parameters are summarised
in Table 1 and discussed below. Calibrated parameters are discussed in section 3.2.2.
12This assumption of a random walk for shocks to female and male wages follows MaCurdy (1982).
13We treat male earnings as exogenous because nearly all male workers in the sample underlying our calibration work full
time. With exogenous earnings, the assumption that male labour supply does not enter the utility function is equivalent to
introducing it into the utility function through an additive term.
10Table 1: Estimated/Fixed Parameter Values
Preference Parameters
γ 1.8 Attanasio and Weber (1995)








High Education Low Education
σξ 0.124 0.133 BHPS
σχ 0.132 0.130 BHPS
a
f
1 0.055 0.016 BHPS
a
f
2 -0.0011 -0.00017 BHPS
am
1 0.054 0.034 BHPS
am
2 -0.0011 -0.00063 BHPS
Median pt





113.2.1 External Parameter Values
Preference Parameters The preference parameters ρ, η and γ in the utility function are set to match
estimated elasticities in the data and the average fraction of time available spent working. The consumption
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set at 0.7 (from Attanasio and Weber, 1995), the hours of work
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set at 0.3 (from Pistaferri, 2003) and the average fraction of time
spent working is set at 0.7. Using our CES utility function (5), the consumption elasticity of intertemporal











− (1 + ρ)
(9)



















To pin down the preference parameters, we assume assets are zero and this allows us to write leisure
and consumption as functions of ρ,η and the wage rate, w. We can then use the average fraction of hours
to pin down η as a function of ρ and w. Finally, we substitute this expression for η and the functions for z
and c into the elasticities (9) and (10) and solve for γ and ρ so that the elasticities at average hours match
the elasiticities in the data. The resulting numbers correspond to γ =1 .8, ρ = −0.2 and η =0 .25.T h e
preference parameters over housing are set through calibration.
The discount factor β is also external to the model, and we assume discounting at a rate of 2% per year.
Credit Market Parameters The parameters that determine the fraction of the house price (λh)a n d
the multiple of earnings (λy) that households can borrow are chosen to match institutional features of the
UK mortgage market.14 We allow households to borrow whichever amount is lower between three times
household earnings (λy =3 ) and 90% of the house price (λh =0 .9). In the ﬁnal part of section 4 we will
analyse the sensitivity of the model to diﬀerent borrowing limits.
For interest rates we use the average 90 day Treasury Bill discount rate in years 1968-199715,w h i c hg i v e s
a real rate of 1.8%.
14The Financial Services Authority Guide to Mortgages (2004) reports that “typically, the maximum mortgage a lender oﬀers
is three times the main earner’s income plus one times any second earner’s income, or two-and-a-half times your joint income.
Some lenders oﬀer more, some less.” Moreover, that “It is possible to borrow up to 100% of the property’s value. But a loan
of more than 75% of the property value often costs extra.”
15We stop in 1997 since in that year the interest rate setting regime was changed when the Bank of England became
independent with a remit to set interest rates to achieve a target inﬂation rate.
12Wage processes We estimate the female wage and male earnings processes using data from the BHPS
for the years 1991-2002 (see Appendix A.3 for details). We estimate separately the parameters for high
and low education groups. The results in table 1 show that high education individuals can expect a more
hump-shaped income proﬁle than their less educated counterparts during their working lives (both a1 and a2
have a bigger magnitude for the high education group). The variance of permanent shocks is similar across
education groups for males and for females with low education, but lower for females with high education.
We assume households work from age 22 to 65 and are retired from age 66 to age 81, when they die. In
retirement, households receive a pension which is equal to 50% of male earnings in the ﬁnal year plus 50%
of female earnings in the ﬁnal year assuming the woman is working for H hours where H is the average
number of hours worked by all women over the life-cycle.
The initial level for (expected) income relative to the (expected) house price is set to match data from
the BHPS. From the data, we calculate the education speciﬁc ratios of the median house price to median
household earnings for heads of household aged 22-26. We match these to the equivalent ratios for initial
income and the initial house price in the model.
House price process Estimation of the parameters of the house price process is based on the Oﬃce of
the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) national and regional house price series for the UK, years 1969-2000.16
We estimate an AR(1) process, with linear trend (equation 6), for the logarithm of real house prices, where
the conversion from nominal house prices was made using the Retail Price Index (RPI, all items). The result
of the estimation is a persistence parameter (ρh) of 0.94,17 a standard deviation of the shock (σε)e q u a lt o
0.089, and a trend growth rate (d) of a little over 2% per year.
Initial Wealth We set the distribution of initial ﬁnancial assets for the two education groups to match
data on 22-26 year olds in the 2000 wave of the BHPS, and we assume that households have zero housing
endowments at age 22.
16We use the series reporting average house prices for all dwellings.
17A unit root test on the persistence parameter does not reject the null hypothesis (ρh =1 ).
133.2.2 Calibrated parameters
Given the parameters above, we set the remaining parameters to ﬁt the model to data on life-cycle home-
ownership proﬁles for household heads aged 26-60 between 1991 and 2000,18 by education group. Since we
model income in retirement, we can quite accurately match home ownership until near the age of retirement.
On the other hand, the model implies that households run down all assets by the end of life (age 81). This
means that we will not obtain a good match for home-ownership among the retired since in the simulations
home-ownership declines to zero in a way not observed in the data.19 Our calibration and comparative
static exercises focus on home-ownership behaviour up to age 60. We do not calibrate the labour supply
interactions with housing shown in ﬁgure 3, rather we use our calibrated model to explore these interactions
in the next section.
The life-cycle ownership proﬁles we will be matching are calculated as an average of the ownership
decisions of diﬀerent cohorts who face diﬀerent house price realisations. To match these average proﬁles
using our model, we simulate 20 diﬀerent realised sequences of the aggregate price process, each of which
is faced by 1,000 individuals. We construct our simulated home ownership proﬁles by averaging across the
resulting 20,000 individuals (see Figure 4). At the end of this section we will discuss the sensitivity of home
ownership to the set of house price sequences, and in particular the eﬀect on life-cycle home ownership of
initial house prices being especially high or low.
Our calibration approach is to choose the transactions cost of buying or selling, F, and the parameters
specifying the utility beneﬁto fh o m eo w n e r s h i p ,µ and θ, to minimise the sum of absolute deviations of
simulated moments from corresponding data moments. The moments we use are the average home ownership
rates for households in low and high education groups, for those aged 26-35, 36-45 and 46-60. We set the
calibrated parameters to be common across the two education groups and since we have 3 parameters to
match 6 moments we cannot achieve a perfect ﬁt. Parameter values from the calibration are summarised in
Table 2. Table 3 presents the calibration statistics and Figure 4 corresponding life-cycle proﬁles, showing
the extent that home-ownership rates predicted by the model match those observed in the data.
Our ﬁxed cost parameter of 6% seems plausible given the costs of employing estate agents, lawyers,
suveyors, removal companies, and other specialists, when moving house in the UK. In addition, residential
18Data come from the years 1991-2000, as years prior to 1991 are aﬀected by the large-scale selling oﬀ of local authority
housing.
19To match home ownership in retirement would require a speciﬁcation of the bequest motive, of imperfections in the annuity
market and possibly of the market for households annuitising their home while remaining home-owners.





Table 3: Calibration Statistics
Statistic High Education Low Education
Data Model Data Model
Ownership Rate (%) 80.9 80.6 64.5 64.5
Age 26 − 35
Ownership Rate (%) 87.7 89.0 73.8 74.0
Age 36 − 45
Ownership Rate (%) 91.8 87.5 77.4 75.2
Age 46 − 60
Sum of absolute deviations 6.7
Home ownership rates are measured across couples in the British Household
























































































































































































































High Education Low Education
Figure 4: Simulated and Actual Home-Ownership Rates
15property transactions incur stamp duty, a transactions tax which has rates varying between zero and 4% of
t h ep r i c eo ft h ep r o p e r t y( t h er a t ei n c r e a s e sw i t ht h e house price) and which is formally paid by the house
buyer.
The fact that the parameters specifying the utility beneﬁto fh o m eo w n e r s h i p ,µ and θ,a r ep o s i t i v e
implies that home ownership is a luxury good: at low levels of consumption the multiplicative term (which
reduces utility) is relatively important, but as consumption increases the additive term (through which
home ownership increases utility) becomes increasingly dominant. Given γ>1, the sign of θ speciﬁes
whether consumption and housing are complements or substitutes. In our calibration, θ>0 and they are
complements: at a given level of consumption, the marginal utility of consumption is higher when individuals
own their own homes.
As mentioned above, the simulated proﬁles of home ownership used in the calibration are obtained by
averaging across many individuals facing 20 diﬀerent sequences of house price realisations. We interpret this
as being similar to averaging across diﬀerent cohorts in the data, since diﬀerent cohorts face diﬀerent house
prices when they ﬁrst enter the housing market, and diﬀerent subsequent house price shocks. To show the
extent to which this averaging matters, in Table 4 we compare the calibration statistics for home ownership
to those arising from diﬀerent initial conditions for the house price. The “Low P0”a n d“ H i g hP 0” columns
refer respectively to proﬁles generated by groups of individuals that began their adult (i.e. modelled) lives
at the time of low and high house prices. The table shows that “lucky” individuals that enter the labour
market when house prices are low, tend to purchase earlier. Further, although this earlier purchase does
give rise to greater average home-ownership over the life-time, by about age 45, the diﬀerence across lucky
and unlucky groups has mostly disappeared. In our model, the earlier purchase by those whose faced a low
initial price occurs for two reasons. Firstly, given our stochastic assumptions on the house price, a low initial
house price implies a high expected rate of return on housing; and secondly, a low initial house price means
that more households have savings and income suﬃcient to overcome the downpayment and income related
borrowing constraints. By middle-age, these eﬀects are less important.
4 Implications for Labour Supply
We now use our model to understand why homeowners work longer hours. We break our analysis into four
stages. First, we show that our model reproduces the correlation between mortgage debt and labour supply
16Table 4: Simulated Homeownership by Initial House Price
Statistic High Education Low Education
Low p0 Baseline High p0 Low p0 Baseline High p0
Ownership Rate (%) 89.9 80.6 71.3 78.9 64.5 52.7
Age 26 − 35
Ownership Rate (%) 91.7 89.0 85.2 81.0 74.0 68.4
Age 36 − 45
Ownership Rate (%) 88.0 87.5 86.0 78.1 75.2 73.9
Age 46 − 60
that is observed in the data. Second, we show that this correlation reﬂects diﬀerences in the ratio of debt
to husband’s earnings rather than diﬀerences in the ratio of debt to the house price, suggesting that current
income and liabilities rather than total wealth are driving female labour supply. Third, we draw out the
heterogeneity in behaviour by looking explicitly at labour supply functions. We show that labour supply is
highly nonlinear in the level of debt, with labour supply being very responsive to debt only at high levels
of debt. Finally, we show that changes in capital market imperfections aﬀect the timing of house purchases,
but have only a limited eﬀect on average labour supply.
The Correlation between Labour Supply and Mortgage Debt In Figure 5 we divide our simulated
data by the extent of mortgage obligations. We deﬁne the obligation ratio for each household as the ratio of
mortgage repayments to other household income (ie excluding female earnings). For each age, we split the
simulated households according to this obligation ratio: a high ratio is deﬁned as being a ratio above the
33rd percentile. We characterise households as either high or low obligation at each age. This means that
households may move from one group to another across their life-time. The reason we do not hold group
composition constant is because there is substantial variation in debt repayments over the life-cycle in our
simulations and so the per-period deﬁnition shows the extent that current obligations matter.
Figure 5 shows that among both the young and the old, greater mortgage repayments are associated with
higher labour supply. This pattern mimics the pattern in the data shown in Figure 3. Further, compared to
non-homeowners, average labour supply is higher for home owners: for the high education group, simulated
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Figure 5: Simulated Labour Supply by Extent of Mortgage Repayment
of 0.74 for home-owners. For the low education group, average labour supply for non-homeowners is 0.67
compared to 0.69 for home owners.
Although Figure 5 reproduces the pattern in the data shown in Figure 3, it also shares the problem that
it does not disentangle the endogeneity of the mortgage repayment to labour supply choices. In particular,
there are two sources of endogeneity: ﬁrst, the high obligation ratio and high female labour supply may both
be due to low husband’s earnings, which directly increase the obligation ratio and give the wife a ﬁnancial
incentive to work more; second, higher levels of debt may be taken out in period t − 1 in anticipation of
working longer hours in period t.
Debt-to-house price vs debt-to-husband earnings To understand the correlation, we now show the
extent to which diﬀerences in labour supply are driven by diﬀerences in household wealth or by diﬀerences
in household income. In Tables 5 and 6, we show, from our simulations, how labour supply varies with
the ratio of debt to the house price and with the ratio of debt to husband’s earnings, respectively. Both
tables show that the greater the indebtedness, the greater labour supply. However, labour supply varies
very little with the debt-to-house price ratio, but varies substantially with the ratio of debt-to-husband’s
earnings. This suggests that the higher labour supply of those with greater debt is being driven not by a
low level of net wealth per se, but rather by the household’s diﬃculty in servicing its debt obligations: it
is the combination of substantial liabilities and low current non-female income that seems to induce higher
female labour supply.
18Table 5: Labour Supply and Debt-to-House Price
Low education High education
Debt to Mean of Female Debt to Mean of Female
House Price Labour Supply House Price Labour Supply
x ≤ 0.45 0.73 x ≤ 0.39 0.76
0.45 <x≤ 0.53 0.72 0.39 <x≤ 0.58 0.77
0.53 <x≤ 0.65 0.73 0.57 <x≤ 0.72 0.76
0.65 <x≤ 0.76 0.73 0.71 <x≤ 0.83 0.75
0.76 <x≤ 0.85 0.74 0.82 <x≤ 0.90 0.75
x>0.85 0.75 x>0.90 0.77
The sample is restricted to age 26-35. Debt refers to home owners and is
measured at the beginning of period. Intervals reported in rows 1-6 are deﬁned
on the basis of, respectively, the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile of
the distribution of the debt-to-house price ratio.
Table 6: Labour Supply and Debt-to-Husband’s Earnings
Low education High education
Debt to Mean of Female Debt to Mean of Female
Husband’s Earnings Labour Supply Husband’s Earnings Labour Supply
x ≤ 2.28 0.63 x ≤ 1.36 0.72
2.28 <x≤ 3.04 0.67 1.36 <x≤ 2.26 0.72
3.04 <x≤ 4.03 0.71 2.23 <x≤ 3.25 0.74
4.03 <x≤ 5.23 0.76 3.21 <x≤ 4.39 0.77
5.23 <x≤ 6.57 0.80 4.33 <x≤ 5.60 0.79
x>6.57 0.83 x>5.60 0.82
The sample is restricted to age 26-35. Debt refers to home owners and is
measured at the beginning of period. Intervals reported in rows 1-6 are deﬁned
on the basis of, respectively, the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile of
the distribution of the debt-to-husband’s earnings ratio.
19Nonlinear Labour supply functions The conclusion about the importance of current income and lia-
bilities is reinforced by looking at the labour supply functions. The labour supply functions also highlight
the degree of nonlinearity in the responsiveness of labour supply.20 In Figure 6 we show how optimal hours
of work in period t depend on mortgage debt held at the end of the previous period and how this dependence
varies with the wife’s wage and with husband earnings. The ﬁgure shows the solution for households at
age 30 who own a house at the start of period t and continue to own through to period t +1 . The striking
point about these policy functions is the sudden increase in gradient that occurs as debt passes a certain
level. At debt beyond this cut-oﬀ, women increase their labour supply sharply in order to make required
mortgage repayments or to satisfy the constraints on remortgaging. Furthermore, the darker parts of the
labour supply functions in the ﬁgure, which indicate that the household chooses to own in period t,s h o w
that households do not always sell their homes in order to avoid these steep sections of the labour supply
function. For example, there is a small range of debt over which a wife with low wages is prepared to increase
her labour supply by between 25 and 40 percentage points rather than choosing to sell their home (see left
panel in Figure 6).
Figure 6 also shows that female labour supply increases with the woman’s wage and decreases with their
husband’s earnings. These eﬀects interact with the eﬀect of the borrowing constraints on labour supply: the
change in gradient of the labour supply function is most pronounced at low values of the woman’s wage.
In Figure 7 we show how optimal hours of work in period t depend on asset holdings at the start of
period t, for households who do not own their home at the start of the period but who buy in period t.
Labour supply varies signiﬁcantly with assets only at low levels of asset holdings where greater labour supply
leading to greater income will ease the house purchase. On the other hand, whereas the steep segments of
the labour supply functions were relevant for those who already owned their homes, the dark segments of
the labour supply functions for those who are thinking about buying indicate that households rarely choose
to purchase a house when assets are in a range where the labour supply function is steeper.
While we have highlighted segments of the policy functions in which labour supply varies dramatically
with assets, for large ranges of asset holdings, average simulated labour supply does not vary much with debt.
This nonlinear nature of labour supply means that sharp eﬀects of debt on behaviour may be underestimated
in looking solely at average behaviour and this underlines the value of analysing labour supply functions.
20We focus in this subsection on the low educated, but very similar results are available for the high educated.

































































































The graphs show labour supply functions for those who own their home in t − 1 and continue to own in t. The darker part of
each line indicates the range of debt where ownership in t is optimal (compared to not owning in t). The scale of debt on the
x-axis is as a ratio of debt to mean income at age 22.

































































































The graphs show labour supply functions for those who who did not own their home in t−1 but who buy in t. The darker part
of each line indicates the range of assets where ownership in t is optimal (compared to not buying in t). The scale of assets on
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Figure 8: Simulated Home-Ownership Rates Varying Income Related Borrowing Constraint, λy
Capital market imperfections While the eﬀects of indebtedness discussed above indicate the extent that
labour supply is aﬀected by debt, the interaction comprises both the eﬀect of capital market imperfections
and the eﬀect of the debt per se. In this subsection, we try to disentangle these eﬀects further by showing
how the eﬀects on labour supply of indebtedness change with the severity of the liquidity constraints faced.
First, we consider the eﬀect of varying the income related borrowing constraint. The eﬀect on home-
ownership of varying λy is shown in Figure 8. Relaxing this constraint leads to households buying their
homes earlier in the life-cycle. By middle age, there is less diﬀerence in the level of ownership, although
some eﬀect remains throughout the life cycle for the low educated. For the sake of space, we do not show
the corresponding labour supply proﬁles as the diﬀerences in these proﬁles are rather small. The fact that
we observe delayed house purchase rather than increased labour supply on average, is consistent with the
evidence from ﬁgure 7 that households will rarely purchase a home when this requires a substantial increase
in labour supply.
This small eﬀect on average labour supply could be masking substantial eﬀects on individual behaviour
since we know from the labour supply functions presented in Figures 7 and 6 that labour supply is nonlinear
in debt in a way that is heterogenous between individuals with diﬀerent incomes, and between home owners
and non-homeowners. To examine this, we show how the labour supply functions vary with the severity of
the borrowing constraints. Figure 9 reports labour supply functions for households who continue to own
between t and t +1 , varying the severity of the income related constraint. A more severe earnings related
borrowing constraint (lower λy) results in labour supply being very responsive to debt at a lower range of
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The graphs show labour supply functions for those who own their home in t − 1 and continue to own in t. The darker part of
each line indicates the range of debt where ownership in t is optimal (compared to not owning in t). The scale of debt on the
x-axis is as a ratio of debt to mean income. Husband earnings are set at the median value
debt holdings. Since the earnings related constraint is the only factor explaining diﬀerences in the three
labour supply functions plotted on each panel of the ﬁgure, the shift of these functions as the constraint
changes clearly indicates that this constraint has a role in shaping the steep segments of the functions. The
labour supply functions for λy =3and λy =1 0overlap in the middle and right panels of the ﬁgure, indicating
that the earnings related constraint has become loose relative to the other constraints in the model and so no
longer inﬂuences behaviour. Similar non-linear labour-supply functions, with a steep segment that shifts as
the borrowing constraint is altered, exist for households who become home owners in period t (not shown).
However, as in ﬁgure 7, it is again the case that non-homeowners rarely choose to buy where the labour
supply function is steeper.
In Figure 10 we show simulated home ownership rates, varying the downpayment requirement, (1 − λh).
Reducing downpayment requirements (increasing λh) leads to households buying their homes earlier in the
life-cycle, but again, by middle-age, there is little diﬀerence in home-ownership across diﬀerent values of the
downpayment requirement. Similarly to changes in λy,c h a n g e si nλh do not result in substantial changes in
the proﬁle of average labour supply (not shown).
Figure 11 reports labour supply functions for diﬀerent values of the downpayment constraint. As with
the earnings-related constraint, an increase in the downpayment constraint makes labour supply sensitive to
debt at lower ranges of debt holdings. Again, a shift of the functions in response to a change in the constraint
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Figure 10: Simulated Home-Ownership Rates Varying Downpayment Constraint, λh
supply functions. However, the diﬀerences between the diﬀerent policy functions is somewhat less marked
than when varying the earnings constraint, especially for the downpayment requirements of 10% and zero
for which the labour supply functions are overlapping or almost overlapping. This reiterates the pattern
from the home-ownership simulations in Figures 8 and 10 which show that, for parameters considered and
for the low educated, the earnings-related constraint has a bigger eﬀect on behaviour.
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The graphs show labour supply functions for those who own their home in t − 1 and continue to own in t. The darker part of
each line indicates the range of debt where ownership in t is optimal (compared to not owning in t). The scale of debt on the
x-axis is as a ratio of debt to mean income. Husband earnings are set at the median value
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper used a structural life-cycle model to address the question of why houseowners with greater debt
work longer hours. Two main conclusions arise from our model: ﬁrst, this correlation is driven more by
24current liabilities than by a lower level of net wealth. This impact of current liabilities arises because it is
less costly to adjust labour supply than to adjust housing stock in order to meet mortgage repayments. This
eﬀect might be less important if capital markets allowed greater borrowing as this would allow borrowing to
adjust following shocks rather than labour supply. We show, however, that relaxing borrowing constraints
can have a substantial eﬀect on the timing of house purchases, but has relatively small eﬀects on the level of
home-ownership from middle-age onwards, and has only small eﬀects on average labour supply. The second
conclusion of our model is that for highly indebted households or households with low wages, labour supply
is very sensitive to changes in debt, whereas for average households, there is much less sensitivity.
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27AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Computational methods: general
The solution for consumption, labour supply and home-ownership is found recursively from the last period
of life, T, backwards. Since there is no bequest motive in our model, and since households are subject to
the constraint of non-negative assets at the end of life, they spend all that it is available to them in the last
period and allocate this optimally between consumption and labour supply, given the optimal choice of home-
ownership. Given the optimal choices at t+1, t<T, they then need to choose home ownership, consumption,
leisure and saving that maximise period t’s value function, subject to the borrowing constraints. We solve
our model via value function iteration rather than using the Euler equation because of the non-convexity of
the value function.21
In order to compute the solution, we discretise the state space for the wages of the husband and wife,
and for the house price. The wage and house price processes are modeled as ﬁnite-state Markov chains
that mimic the underlying continuous-valued AR(1) processes, as described in Tauchen (1986). The wage
processes are represented by 11 nodes, whereas the house price process is represented by 13 nodes. For
assets, we use a grid of 100 nodes but maintain a continuous underlying variable. Points are more dense
in the lower range of the asset grid where the curvature of the value function is likely to be changing more
rapidly. Given the solution of the household optimisation problem at each point of the grid, we approximate
the policy functions and the value functions at points oﬀ the asset grid using linear interpolation.
A.2 Computational methods: endogenous liquidity constraint
We would like to solve for consumption and labour supply using two-stage budgeting, solving ﬁrst for total
within period spending (on goods and leisure), and then for consumption and labour supply given that
level of total within period spending and wages. However, in our model the income-related constraint is
endogenous with respect to labour supply. This means that the choice of labour supply can aﬀect how much
the household can borrow and that we cannot treat total spending as given when choosing labour supply.
This situation arises only for those who choose to own a home in (at the end of) the current period t:f o r
those who sell or choose not to buy borrowing is bounded by an amount (0)t h a td o e sn o tv a r yw i t hl a b o u r
supply, and so two-stage budgeting is feasible. In this section we describe the computational approach used
21Non-convexities in the value function arise from having transaction costs associated to buying and selling the house and
also from the interactions of diﬀe r e n tc r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t s .
28for ﬁnding consumption and labour supply for home-owners.
Within the group of home-owners it can be conceptually useful to distinguish between those who buy
their property in the current period, and those who are continuing owners. The former group must take out
a mortgage in the current period if they want to borrow, whereas the latter group has the choice between
carrying over their existing debt (provided that theyr e p a ya tl e a s tt h en e wi n t e r e s to nt h i sd e b t-s e e
equation (3) of main text) or taking out a new mortgage. In this appendix we refer to a case in which there
is an option of carrying over existing debt. The computational procedure for a new buyer22 is the special
case of the setup described in which the debt that can be carried over is zero.
The procedure for ﬁnding consumption and labour supply for home-owners proceeds in a series of steps:
• 1. Solve the model as if two-stage budgeting were possible. Set limits on total expenditure at this step
such that end-of period debt can be no bigger than the greater allowed by: beginning-of-period
debt minus current interest paid on debt (see (3) of the main text); or the debt associated with
whichever constraint is binding between the downpayment constraint and the earnings-related
constraint when the latter is a function of maximum possible female labour supply (lt =1 ).23 We
will refer to this solution as the ‘partially constrained solution’.
2. Check whether the debt level implied by the ‘partially constrained solution’ exceeds the level
allowed by carrying over existing debt (ie Dt−1).24 If it does not the ‘partially constrained
solution’ is feasible without remortgaging and is the constrained solution. If this level of debt is
exceeded, proceed to step 3.
3. Check whether the debt level implied by the ‘partially constrained solution’ exceeds the level
allowed by the earnings-related borrowing constraint when this debt limit is calculated based on
the level of labour supply associated with the ‘partially constrained solution’. If this constraint
is not violated, then due to the way in which step 1 was set up, we know that the ‘partially con-
strained solution’ does not violate the borrowing constraints associated with remortgaging. Since
remortgaging is costless, this implies that the ‘partially constrained solution’ is the constrained
solution. If this constraint is violated, proceed to step 4.
22Or an existing owner who had paid oﬀ their mortgage by the start of period t.
23In fact we also take account of the implicit constraint due to the no bankruptcy condition here, but this is rarely the binding
constraint until late in the household’s lifetime.
24This step is eﬀectively redundant for new buyers unless they are wealthy enough to buy a property without borrowing.
294. Search for a new (higher) constrained level of labour supply, exploiting the information that the
earnings-related constraint is binding. At each iteration of this search, we have to check whether
the higher level of lt associated with the constraint still results in the earnings-related constraint
being binding, or whether this in fact becomes less tight than the downpayment constraint.25
End-of-period assets are given by the binding constraint and consumption is found residually
through the budget constraint. For example, if the earnings related constraint binds and the
household is buying a house, then substituting from (2) into (1) (equations are in main text) and
rearranging yields:
ct = At +( 1+λy)(wtlt + xt) − ptht − Fp t
Having found labour supply, consumption and saving, we can obtain the value associated with
remortgaging with constrained labour supply. We also compute the value associated with not
remortaging and instead repaying (at least) the interest on existing debt (if this permits a feasible
outcome). The household’s behaviour is determined by choosing the maximum of the values for
the constrained solution with remortgaging, and the solution with interest repayment.
A.3 Estimation of wage variance and deterministic trend
We estimate the variance of the wage processes for the UK by drawing on the methodology developed in
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2004) for estimating the variance of the permanent and transitory shocks
to income. Blundell et al. (2004) adopt the following income process for household i:
logYi,a,t = Z0
i,a,t + Hi,a,t + υi,a,t
where a and t index age and time respectively, Y is real income, Z is a set of observable characteristics, H and
υ are, respectively, a permanent and a transitory income component. They then assume that the permanent
component Hi,a,t follows a martingale process: Hi,a,t = Hi,a,t−1 + ςi,a,t and that the transitory component
υi,a,t follows an MA(q)p r o c e s s :υi,a,t =
Pq
j=0 θjεi,a−j,t−j, (θ0 ≡ 1). They can therefore obtain an expression
for “unexplained” income growth as follows: ∆yi,a,t = ςi,a,t + ∆υi,a,t,w h e r eyi,a,t = logYi,a,t − Z0
i,a,t (real
income net of predictable individual components), and derive covariance restrictions in panel data, as follows:
cov(∆ya,t,∆ya+s,t+s)=
½
var(ςa,t)+var(∆υa,t) for s =0
cov(∆υa,t,∆υa+s,t+s) for s 6=0
25Or indeed, than the no bankruptcy constraint.
30where var(·) and cov(·) denote cross-sectional variances and covariances. In the particular case of serially
uncorrelated transitory shocks, var(ςa,t) becomes only a function of “unexplained” income growth:
var(ςa,t)=cov(∆ya,t,∆ya−1,t−1 + ∆ya,t + ∆ya+1,t+1) (11)
Recalling that we only allow for permanent shocks in our wage process (equation (7)), and assuming
that in our data the transitory shocks are uncorrelated, we base the estimation of the variance of permanent
shocks on equation (11). In particular, we need to obtain real wages net of predictable individual components
and use their lags to construct the covariance between a one-period lag and a three-period lag, as follows:
var(ξa,t)=cov(∆˜ wa,t,∆˜ wa−1,t−1 + ∆˜ wa,t + ∆˜ wa+1,t+1)
where ˜ w is the logarithm of real wages net of predictable individual components.
For males, this is obtained as the residual from a regression, for each education group, of individual
log-real hourly wages on a quadratic term in age, 5-year cohort and region dummies, a dummy for being
married, household size, and number of children in the household. The resulting wage variance (and standard
errors in parentheses26) is 0.0170 (0.00226) for the group with low education and 0.0174 (0.00177) for the
group with high education.
For females, we deal with selection into the labour market by estimating a Heckman model. ˜ w is therefore
the residual from a regression of log-real hourly wages on a quadratic term in age, 5-year cohort dummies and
dummies for region, where selection is based on the following "excluded variables": other household income
(i.e. annual household income excluding female labour income), number of children, household size, and
dummy for being married. The resulting wage variance (and standard errors in parentheses, bootstrapped
as for males) is 0.0178 (0.00221) for the group with low education and 0.0153(0.00273) for the group with
high education.
The coeﬃcients for the deterministic component of both the male and the female wage processes are given
by the quadratic terms in age in the respective regressions. Estimated coeﬃcients (and robust standard errors
in parentheses) for, respectively, the linear and the quadratic term, are as follows: 0.034 (0.0036) and -0.00063
(0.00009) for males with low education, 0.054 (0.0043) and -0.0011 (0.0001) for males with high education,
0.016 (0.0027) and -0.00017 (0.00006) for females with low education, 0.055 (0.0033) and -0.00114 (0.00009)
for females with high education.
26Standard errors computed by bootstrapping 500 samples of size n, where n is the number of individual clusters in our data.
31